Returning moral philosophy to American higher education
Meriwether N.K.
2007
The Schooled Heart: Moral Formation in American Higher Education
3
Imagine yourself as an undergraduate attending a college that takes with utmost seriousness the moral formation of its students. In addition to earnest appeals to civic virtue in convocations and the occasional lecture, and encouragement to community service in dorms and college clubs, the curriculum culminates in a rigorous, year-long capstone course in moral philosophy. In the fall of your final year, you file into class with your fellow seniors and, peering anxiously into the well of the lecture hall, you see none other than the college president himself reviewing an overstuffed binder for the first day's lecture. For the next hour, and in the weeks and months to follow, the president lays out in a rigorous, systematic way a foundation for personal morality and public duty, much in the manner of a biology or chemistry course. In effect, his lectures in moral philosophy seek to develop through deductive logic and empirical observation a harmonious synthesis of our various moral duties, viz., to family, to society, and to God, and also to demonstrate how the performance of these duties contributes to one's personal happiness. Although explicit references to other thinkers, or even the major theorists of Western civilization, are relatively few and far between, he has borrowed liberally from the thought of others. The textbook for the course is written by the president himself, and in his lectures he makes little effort to offer views opposing his own; when they are treated, it is always in order to show the superiority of his own view to theirs. For the course is not a survey in Western moral theory, nor is it designed merely to encourage moral reflection. The point of the course is to provide the student with a moral philosophy that will guide him through life's challenges. Accordingly, the president is not loathe to apply moral norms in delineating what he believes to be appropriate student behavior, and like most others, you cannot help but occasionally experience the unwelcome sting of remorse at your own failings. He is also quite clear in his stance regarding issues of public controversy, much to the delight of those who agree and the chagrin of those who differ. Naturally, some students resent the loss of time they might otherwise have spent on courses within their chosen field, but since the college prides itself on its commitment to the moral formation of its students, and because the course is required, the vast majority do not consider it burdensome. Besides, a good many of the students respect and appreciate the foundation that the president provides, and it is not unusual for discussions of his views to turn into lively debates at the refectory and in the dorm rooms. Regardless of whether the students agree or disagree, by graduation they all readily concede that they have been provided with a vigorous, substantive theory of morality that demands either adoption or repudiation (however qualified) and that will reverberate in their lives for years to come. What I describe above would have been a standard feature in the nineteenth- century liberal arts college; it is virtually unheard of today. Required courses in moral philosophy, which had been part of university education for centuries in the West, effectively died out by the early twentieth century. Should we view the demise of the requirement in moral philosophy as a welcome liberation from the hidebound pedantry and autonomy-destroying indoctrination of traditional education? Or should we view it as contributing to the desultory, goalless nihilism of higher education critiqued by the late Neil Postman: Modern secular education is failing . . . because it has no moral, social, or intellectual center. There is no set of ideas or attitudes that permeates all parts of the curriculum. The curriculum is not, in fact, a "course of study" at all but a meaningless hodgepodge of subjects. It does not even put forward a clear vision of what constitutes an educated person, unless it is a person who possesses "skills." In other words, a technocrat's ideal-a person with no commitment and no point of view but with plenty of marketable skills.1 My objective in what follows is to provide a compelling case for a requirement in moral philosophy as a capstone course in the secular or religiously affiliated university or college curriculum within the context of a pedagogy of ethics instruction that complements and justifies such a requirement. Central to that case is, of course, the theme of this volume, viz., the pressing need for university-level education to contribute to the moral formation of students, and just as importantly, the need to critique the reigning assumptions and tendencies within the academy that undermine or dilute any such effort, such as relativism, nihilism, and positivism. I shall argue that this can only be achieved if combined with the rejection of the dominant progressive approach to ethics instruction that emphasizes the instructor's neutrality, unguided discussion of ethical dilemmas, and autonomous choice, an approach I call a pedagogy of mediation. Ethics education requires at a minimum a pedagogy of profession; that is, one that presents, argues for, defends, and applies a normative ethical theory. To this end, I shall critique the dominant contemporary approach to moral education that purports to teach ethics in a neutral or mediatorial manner, and address some standard objections to using the ethics classroom to profess a normative ethical theory. As Michael Beaty and Douglas Henry make clear at the outset of this volume, the history of moral formation in American higher education is one of retreat, eventual abandonment, and-by the late 1960s-a partialyet- confused recovery from that abandonment. I call it partial because a university expresses its priorities and commitments primarily through what it requires in order to obtain a degree. When an area of inquiry is not a required part of the curriculum, as is the case with ethics in the vast majority of secular and religious institutions, it cannot be considered central to the mission of that institution, regardless of how much character formation "talk" is included in catalogs and brochures. According to one rather comprehensive study, institutions in which students report the greatest gains in character formation "go well beyond simply offering opportunities for their students to reflect, refine, and test their values, ethics and attitudes. . . . [These] institutions . . . present a range of char- Acter-testing activities and require their students to take part in more than a few."2 Yet if one is going to require character-formative activities, we must also require a systematic exposition of the foundations of public and private moral responsibility, unless we assume, against all experience-not to mention the wisdom of the ages-that students enter college with complete conceptual clarity on the nature of the human good. And so I also call that recovery confused, because if ethics is taught merely as case studies-oriented "applied ethics" within the framework of progressive theories of moral education (and it generally is), it is as likely to disorient the students' moral beliefs as strengthen them. The requirement in moral philosophy that I propose will be informed in significant ways by the moral philosophy course of the nineteenth century described above, but will also differ in important respects. The profession of moral philosophy cannot occur in a cultural-historical vacuum; it must be sensitive to the age and ethos it inhabits, and we are alas far removed from a time in which moral formation was an accepted and welcomed component of higher education. © 2007 Baylor University Press.
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