CHI TIẾT NGHIÊN CỨU …
Tiêu đề
Beyond rational autonomy: Levinas and the incomparable worth of the student as singular other
Tác giả
Joldersma C.W.
Năm xuất bản
2008
Source title
Interchange
Số trích dẫn
3
DOI
10.1007/s10780-008-9040-9
Liên kết
Tóm tắt
This article explores the question: Why are students of worth? Educationally, an answer often involves a Kantian response: They are of worth because they are always ends and never means. This response is usually connected to a notion of autonomy interpreted as individual, rational self-determination. The article argues for a different answer. The essay begins with a recent educational example of construing worth as rational autonomy. Meira Levinson, in her book The Demands of Liberal Education (1999), argues for a version of rational autonomy which is taken in the essay as a Kantian response to the question. The essay then turns to Kant's own understanding of intrinsic human worth as ends. Although the essay agrees in general with the notion of end, it criticizes Kant's version of rational autonomy. Instead, it argues for a notion of worth as irreplaceable singularity. Both the critique of the Kantian answer and theessay'salternative are shaped by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Here technical notions of "the other," proximity and singularity are brought to bear on the question of human worth. The Levinasian alternative, so the essay argues, better answers the question of student worth by highlighting the incomparability of the student as a singular other. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Từ khóa
Autonomy; Dignity; Education; Individuality; Kant; Levinas; Proximity; Rationality; Responsibility; Singularity; Teacher
Tài liệu tham khảo
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Nơi xuất bản
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Hình thức xuất bản
Article
Open Access
Nguồn
Scopus